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Two of the chapters of Defending Biodiversity are particularly relevant to Leopoldian defenses of 
biodiversity (that is, defenses of biodiversity inspired by the work of Aldo Leopold): Chapter 9, 
which discusses ecoholist defenses of biodiversity, and Chapter 10, which discusses J. Baird 
Calliott’s interpretation of Leopold.  In both chapters, Newman, Varner, and Linquist (hereafter 
NVL) cast doubt on whether such defenses, in their current form, have been successful. I was 
invited to participate in this symposium because my interpretations of Leopold and ecoholism 
differ from the canonical ones and because I’ve been explicitly connecting Leopold’s work to 
contemporary ecology and conservation biology, the authors understandably not having been 
able to incorporate all defenses of biodiversity in their book, especially ones like mine that were 
being produced concurrently or subsequent to the time that their book was being written.  
 
More specifically, NVL state: “From our critical discussion of Callicott on Leopold, we conclude 
that, philosophically speaking, Leopold’s land ethic is weakly supported and, practically speaking, 
we think that A Sand County Almanac itself provides precious little guidance” (2017, 302).  What I 
will argue here is that the results of my ongoing project show: 1) There is a more accurate 
interpretation of Leopold that is not subject to the criticisms made by NVL, and 2) Leopold’s 
body of work as a whole, including but not limited to the essay “The Land Ethic” in A Sand 
County Almanac, provides quite a bit of useful guidance and perspective. 
 
In what follows, I begin with a brief summary of some of my work on Leopold so far, with 
apologies that given space constraints the details of the arguments are contained within the 
papers themselves.  This is intended to orient the reader who is more familiar with Callicott’s 
interpretations.  I then discuss NVL’s Chapter 10 first followed by a discussion of their Chapter 
9, responding to their critiques.  I then conclude. 
 
2. Millstein’s reinterpretation of Leopold’s Land Ethic 
 
In Millstein (2015), I argue against Callicott’s (1987) claim that Leopold was committed to a view 
where the value of a land community is grounded in our extending moral sentiments to it.  I 
show that there is scant textual evidence that Leopold was referencing Darwin’s views about the 
evolution of ethics – and thus likewise scant evidence that Leopold was endorsing a Humean 
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basis in moral sentiments for the land ethic.  Moreover, I show that there is strong textual 
evidence for the view that Leopold’s reference to the struggle for existence was to Chapter 3 of 
the Origin of Species, titled “Struggle for Existence,” where Darwin discusses the interdependencies 
between species – a central theme of “The Land Ethic” – at great length. 
 
In Millstein (2018a), I elaborate Leopold’s conception of interdependence – the concept that lies at 
the heart of the land ethic – in line with contemporary ecology.  I argue that Leopoldian 
interdependencies are between both biotic and abiotic components and encompass “positive” and 
“negative” ecological interactions (e.g., predator/prey, parasite/host, competitive interactions, 
mutualistic interactions). Indeed, what counts as “negative” and “positive” turns out to depend 
on context, time scale, and level of organization; for example, wolves predating on deer might 
have a “negative” effect on deer population sizes, but ultimately have a “positive” effect on the 
health of individual deer (because their population sizes are kept in check and they are less likely 
to run out of food to forage). 
 
In Millstein (2018b), I debunked six myths about Aldo Leopold's land ethic.  Here I’ll mention 
three of the six debunked myths that are particularly relevant for the discussion here.  One myth 
is that there there is a two-sentence “summary moral maxim” of the land ethic (“A thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong 
when it tends otherwise” Leopold, 1949, 224–225). These are only two sentences in a lifetime of 
work of a scientist/practitioner, not a philosopher, and they read much differently when 
considered in context of his life and work1 (including the rest of “The Land Ethic”) rather than in 
isolation.  Another myth is that ecosystems are the only entities of value in the land ethic.  There 
is good evidence that Leopold’s land ethic values individual organisms as well as ecological 
wholes (in agreement with with Callicott’s later work but in contrast to his early work).  Finally, 
there is the myth that by stability, Leopold meant something like balance or dynamic equilibrium.  As 
Freyfogle (2008) points out, too many authors simply assume that Leopold meant by stability 
what other ecologists of his time meant. Instead, as Julianne Warren (2016) persuasively 
demonstrates, by stability Leopold meant something closer to land health.  In addition to debunking 
six myths, my paper makes the positive point that a correctly interpreted land ethic can be used 
to understand and justify successful restoration projects such as the Yolo Bypass in northern 
California's Sacramento Valley. 
 
In Millstein (2018c), I argue that Leopold’s concept of a land community (he uses the term biotic 
community interchangeably) is neither the community concept of early 20th century ecologists such 
as Clements nor the ecosystem concept of Tansley and subsequent ecologists.  Rather, it contains 
elements of both concepts: interactions between species populations and matter/energy flows, 
respectively.  I further show that Leopold’s land community concept is consonant with much 
contemporary work in ecology.  Finally, in response to worries that the land community isn’t 
enough of an entity (thing, individual) to be morally considerable, I demonstrate how the 
boundaries of land communities can be delineated by discontinuities in the strengths of 
interactions between species populations and matter/energy flows. 
 
In short, in these and other papers I argue for alternative interpretations to the ones that Callicott 
has defended, I elaborate and clarify the central concepts underlying the land ethic, and argue 
                                               
1 See Meine (2010). 
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that Leopold’s views are to a large extent consistent with contemporary ecology.   
 
3. Seven NVL criticisms of Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold and responses 
 
In this section, I identify seven criticisms that NVL give of Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold in 
Chapter 10 of their book and offer a response to each one, not on behalf of Callicott (who 
presumably would give different responses) but in light of my interpretation of Leopold, sketched 
in the previous section. 
 
1. NVL criticism: Leopold’s land ethic espouses extreme holism, suggesting that individual 
organisms (including humans) should always be sacrificed for the good of the land 
community.  It is therefore draconian or fascist. Importantly, though, NVL acknowledge that 
this was a view of Leopold that Callicott endorsed early on and later retracted; as NVL 
recognize, Callicott no longer thinks this is the correct interpretation of Leopold. 
 
Millstein response: On this point, I agree with Callicott’s later work.  Leopold speaks 
directly of the rights of individuals and talks of the land ethic as an “accretion” to (not a 
replacement of) previous ethical systems.  He should not be understood as an extreme holist.  
The criticism of extreme holism is legitimate, but participants to this debate now agree that it 
is not a criticism of Leopold’s view.  We can therefore set it aside and move onto more 
important issues. 
2. NVL criticism: Callicott commits the fallacy of “appeal to authority” by appealing to 
Darwin’s views on the evolution of ethics, Hume’s views on ethics, and communitarianism. 
 
Millstein Response: As noted in the previous section, my interpretation doesn’t rely on 
any of those traditions. I do appeal to Darwin as a scientist for interpretive purposes 
regarding interdependence but I also draw on contemporary scientific work (as well as 
philosophical argumentation) to defend the concept.  Perhaps these can be seen as appeals to 
authority, but I believe they are no different to the citations to scientific work that NVL rely 
on throughout the course of their book. 
3. NVL criticism: There are problems with Callicott’s second-order principles for 
adjudicating conflicts between individuals and communities. 
 
Millstein Response: I do not endorse Callicott’s second-order principles, so the concerns 
that NVL raise here do not directly apply to my account.  Nonetheless, it is undeniable that 
conflicts between what is best for individuals and what is best for communities as a whole are 
bound to arise and that adjudicating these conflicts will be difficult. This is work-in-progress 
for me, but here’s what I’ve said in print so far (Millstein 2015).   
 
Following Don Marietta (1999), we shouldn’t ignore relevant sources of value by arbitrary 
fiat simply to achieve one clear answer.   That is, there are good reasons to think that 
individuals have value based on characteristics such as their autonomy, their ability to feel 
pain, or even simply because they are alive, but that communities likewise have 
characteristics such as land health (more on this below) that are worthy of protection.  
Although the easiest route is to declare categorically the ways in which some values trump 
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other values, the easiest route unjustifiably sacrifices some values for others. 
 
Instead of thinking we can have an algorithm that will produce an answer to our complex 
questions, glossing over difficult tradeoffs, we might consider characterizing processes by which 
communities could make such decisions.  The process might be similar to the one that Helen 
Longino (1990) describes for balancing competing values in science, notably including a 
diversity of perspectives.  This would involve bringing different constituencies with their 
different values to the table, but with rules for their engagement such as uptake in response to 
legitimate criticism and equality of intellectual authority. This suggestion is Leopoldian in 
spirit, considering his frequent consultations with hunters, farmers, foresters, etc., in decision-
making processes (as documented in Meine 2010). 
4. NVL criticism: Callicott invokes group selection in a problematic way. 
 
Millstein Response: My interpretation does not invoke group selection, since I am not 
claiming that Leopold thought that humans have evolved the tendency to extend moral 
sentiments to groups with which they are interdependent.2  Although Leopold thought that 
coming to respect land communities would typically involve emotions such as love, he 
strongly emphasized that this was also an intellectual process (requiring understanding of the 
science underlying the workings of a land community), and there is no reason to think that he 
saw these as evolved tendencies, as Callicott claims. 
5. NVL criticism: NVL suggest (perhaps following Callicott) that Leopold adopts Clements’s 
conception of community, a conception, they claim, that is tied to the understanding of a 
community as a superorganism.  The problem is, they argue, that Clements’s notion of 
community is outdated and has been discredited. 
 
Millstein Response: It’s worth noting that in recent work Callicott has developed an 
alternative conception of community (Callicott 2013), but in my view, it was not necessary 
for him to do so.  As noted in the previous section, I have argued that although Leopold’s 
conception of community shares some common elements with Clements’s, it is distinctly his 
own, and that it is in fact in line with much contemporary work in ecology. 
6. NVL criticism: If we update Leopold’s community concept for the ecology of today, then 
we are limited to the local scale. At larger scales, interactions other than the common 
ecological ones (predation, parasitism, competition, etc.) matter most for species composition 
– at a medium scale, factors like speciation, migration, and extinction; at a continental scale, 
factors like geology and climate. This would have the unfortunate consequence that the land 
ethic would give short-shrift to larger-scale environmental concerns.3 
 
Millstein response: This is an interesting criticism that is worthy of more response than I 
can give it here.  But here is a sketch of one.  What is essential for Leopold’s land ethic is 
                                               
2 That being said, I do not find group selection as problematic as NVL seem to; my point is only that it is 
not relevant for understanding or defending Leopold. 
3 Again, it’s worth noting that Callicott’s more recent work attempts to address the larger scale with a 
defense of a Leopoldian “earth ethic” (Callicott 2013). 
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interdependence, not any particular manifestation of interdependence.  Quoting Leopold: “All 
ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a 
community of interdependent parts” (1949, 203).  
 
Thus, it doesn’t really matter for Leopold’s account which interactions underlie 
interdependencies; they can be the traditional ecological interactions such as predator/prey, 
parasite/host, etc., but there is no reason they they have to be.  Contemporary ecologists can 
and do speak of meta-communities, meta-meta-communities, etc.  If it turns out that the 
interactions underlying these larger scale entities are, following NVL, factors like speciation, 
migration, and extinction, or factors like geology and climate, these interactions still serve to 
create interdependencies between individuals and between local land communities, and it is 
these interdependencies, I argue, that form the basis for our moral obligations. 
 
Consider climate, for example.  With human-caused climate change already well underway, 
it becomes even more true that the changes that humans make have effects on other local 
land communities across the globe.  We can no longer separate climate from the activities of 
organisms – and arguably, they never could be separated, with our oxygen atmosphere 
resulting from the evolution  of cyanobacteria as one such example.  Geology is likewise 
intertwined with the activities of organisms; mountaintop removal mining is a clear example, 
organismic influence on soil is another.  So, even though it might turn out to be the case that 
each of us is most strongly interdependent with our local communities, the larger-scale 
interdependencies are still substantial and are arguably morally relevant. 
7. NVL criticism: Callicott misinterprets Hume. 
 
Millstein Response: As mentioned above, my interpretation does not invoke Hume. 
To summarize this section: The criticisms 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 that NVL have made of Callicott’s 
interpretation of Leopold in Chapter 10 do not challenge the interpretation of Leopold that I 
have defended.  More work needs to be done to respond to criticisms 3 and 6, i.e., with respect to 
resolving conflicts between individuals and communities and to address how the land ethic 
handles scales larger than local land communities, but I believe that the tools to respond more 
fully in a Leopoldian vein are present. 
4. NVL’s discussion of ASCA’s “practical guidance” (Ch. 10) and responses 
 
After discussing Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold, NVL turn to the practical guidance from 
Leopold himself in A Sand County Almanac (ASCA).  They identify the following five claims as 
exhausting the practical guidance from Leopold himself: 
 
1. We do not (and probably cannot) know enough to tinker precisely with ecosystems, 
designing them to get just the outcomes we want.  
2. Regions vary in resilience, in the amount of human modification they can sustain without 
losing their long-term fecundity.  
3. In all regions, the original, naturally evolved biota maintain long-term fecundity; 
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introduced species may or may not.  
4. In more fragile regions, a greater effort should be made to adopt agricultural and 
landscaping practices which mimic or approximate the original, naturally evolved 
ecosystems of the region.  
5. In all regions, samples of the original biota (including all native species) should be 
preserved. 
Regarding these five claims, NVL assert: 
We think that statements ##2–5 above are good general advice with regard to the value 
of biodiversity and how to preserve it. But the advice reflects considerations of 
instrumental value of biodiversity in supporting ecosystem services, rather than an 
ecoholist appeal to the intrinsic value of species and ecosystems. And as far as practical 
guidance goes, statements ##2–5 are of the ‘be sure to pay heed to this in deciding on a 
general conservation strategy’ variety, rather than principles that give much substantive, 
practical guidance to policy makers (2017, 352; emphasis added). 
I basically agree that these five statements represent points that Leopold urged, although I might 
quibble with some of the wording; for example, as noted already, “ecosystem” is not an entirely 
accurate representation of what Leopold meant by land community, and “long-term fecundity,” a 
term usually used to refer to the number of offspring produced by individual organisms, seems an 
odd choice to express what Leopold called stability or land health. Since Leopold was such an 
individualistic thinker, it’s probably best to use his own terms rather than contemporary ones, 
and I think this is in general a good practice when discussing historical figures.  Nonetheless, 
again, I do think that the five claims that NVL identified are more or less ones that Leopold did 
indeed endorse. 
However, I think there is far more practical guidance to be found in his work and more to be said 
about each statement.  As noted in Section 2, I’ve previously argued that Leopold’s ideas can 
provide a defensible and fruitful ethical basis for restoration projects.  But most relevantly for the 
topic of biodiversity is the question of stability or land health.  By land health, Leopold meant the 
ability of the land to cycle nutrients efficiently and continuously over long periods of time 
(Warren 2016).  This, Leopold hypothesized, requires long and diverse food chains, so that, e.g., 
nutrients would be “bound up” in organisms and not get lost to soil erosion ([1942] 1999]. This 
would permit the land to continue to sustain life over time, making it capable of self-renewal.  
Thus, preserving species – one sense of preserving biodiversity – is key to preserving land health 
because it is key to preserving the long and diverse food chains (representing interdependencies 
between species) required for land health.  But does this merely reflect “considerations of 
instrumental value of biodiversity in supporting ecosystem services”, as NVL suggest that 
Leopold’s advice does?  Not if land communities have intrinsic value4 and not if land health is the 
                                               
4 In what follows, “intrinsic value” can be understood in a minimal way, e.g., “things valued for their own 
sake apart from their usefulness to us” or in a more robust way, e.g. “things that have value even in the 
absence of any valuers.” NVL make a similar distinction in their book; my claim here is only that the 
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characteristic of land communities that we ought to try to preserve. 
 
So, let us turn (briefly) to the topic of intrinsic value, which NVL discuss in Chapter 9. 
 
5. Intrinsic value arguments for ecoholism 
 
In Chapter 9, NVL accuse many proponents of intrinsic value of ecological wholes of committing 
various fallacies (e.g., the naturalistic fallacy) or of making other problematic arguments. There is 
probably more to be said about each of these and whether Leopold makes any of these purported 
mistakes, but for reasons of space, I’ll just focus on what NVL take to be a reasonable sort of 
argument: the method of reflective equilibrium/coherentism (Ch. 7): “In the method of reflective 
equilibrium, one repeatedly examines the consistency of one’s beliefs, making adjustments at one 
or both levels, until they are all in harmony with each other” (2017, 219).  An example might be 
Singer’s argument in defense of sentientism, which appeals to common beliefs about interests and 
the ethical relevance of the ability to feel pain to argue that sentient animals have interests, too, 
on pain of inconsistency. 
 
To be clear, NVL don’t fully endorse the method of reflective equilibrium because it cannot tell 
us whether an ethical theory is true, only that the proposed ethical theory is part of a coherent set 
of beliefs.  They nonetheless choose to deploy it in the book because 1) almost everyone in fact 
relies on it, 2) it is a reasonable approach to justifying beliefs (again, although not “proving” them 
to be true) and expresses a commitment to rationality in ethics, and 3) there are “extensive 
limitations on both appeals to self-evidence and appeals to logical requirements in establishing 
the truth of moral judgements, principles, and theories” (2017, 221-223).  I agree that the 
method of reflective equilibrium is a reasonable approach to justifying beliefs, and so, in the 
absence of anything better (and in the absence of any other approach endorsed by NVL), I will 
use it here. 
 
It seems to me that we can understand Leopold’s argument in “The Land Ethic” as using the 
method of reflective equilibrium5 and thus needn’t attribute to him any of the mistakes in 
reasoning that NVL are concerned about.  Here I reconstruct:6 
 
1. Given interdependence between humans, we accept the value of human communities and 
accept limitations on our actions (rules of conduct) to benefit and protect those 
communities; our ethical theories capture these rules of conduct. 
2. Ecology shows us that we are not just interdependent with other humans, but also 
interdependent with other species and with abiotic components such as soil and water; 
                                               
arguments I make do not depend on one reading vs. another.  As for Leopold, it’s clear that he at least 
means to endorse the minimal sense; whether his reference to “value in the philosophical sense” (1949, 
223) commits him to the more robust sense is difficult to determine. 
5 Although I think Leopold’s argument can reasonably be understood as deploying the method of 
reflective equilibrium, as explained below, not much hangs on that claim.  If the reader prefers, it can 
simply be understood as an appeal to consistency in our ethical beliefs. 
6 I hope that even without the textual evidence, this argument seems familiar to readers of “The Land 
Ethic.” 
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together, we form land communities. 
3. Therefore [consistency demands], we ought to recognize that our land communities have 
value and that we ought to accept an ethical theory that benefits and protects them – a 
land ethic. 
The main change to our ethical belief system would thus be to include land communities as 
morally considerable entities, although other beliefs would have to change as well.  For example, 
Leopold famously states that “a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the 
land-community to plain member and citizen of it, implying “respect for [one’s] fellow-members, 
and also respect for the community as such” (1949, 204). But note also that Leopold says that the 
land ethic is a “product of social evolution” and that “evolution never stops” (1949, 225). Perhaps 
it’s not too much of a stretch to read this as saying that further adjustments to one’s beliefs in 
light of consistency may be required, something that would probably have been all too evident to 
someone who began his career believing in predator control and yet at the end of his life 
mourned the death of a wolf he had killed many years before.7 
Here it might be objected that neither I nor Leopold has shown that human communities have 
intrinsic value, and if they don’t, then the reflective equilibrium argument (however legitimate) 
cannot support the intrinsic value of land communities.  This requires more argumentation than 
I can give here, but I think it is at least not implausible to think (we think) that human 
communities have intrinsic value, given the sacrifices that many human individuals make for the 
good of their communities, even at the end of their lives when they cannot hope to benefit 
themselves. (Soldiers who are willing to die for their countries come to mind). If this is right, then 
the reflective equilibrium argument for the intrinsic value of land communities holds. As NVL’s 
arguments suggest, this would not prove the truth of the conclusion of the argument, but it could 
serve to justify it and show that the land ethic is part of a coherent set of ethical beliefs, rather 
than merely being an instrumental set of guidelines. 
Another objection to the reconstructed argument might be that human communities and land 
communities are not sufficiently analogous to one another to make the consistency claim – that 
the interdependencies between humans, based on our relationships within families and within 
societies, are very different from interdependencies among biotic and abiotic entities more 
generally.  It is true that many human interdependencies are social – but then, depending on 
species, some animal interdependencies are social, too.  Let’s take a closer look at 
interdependencies for a moment. 
Clearly, many ecological interactions have to do with survival: competitive interactions, 
predator/prey interactions, parasite/host interactions, mutualistic interactions.  But, at the risk of 
being reductionistic, many human interactions do, too.  The most obvious example is a parental 
care for an offspring, but the truth is that we humans all depend on each other in a variety of 
ways, whether it is providing food, shelter, transportation – all of which are analogous to 
ecological interactions.  Even the “negative” interactions, which I argue give rise to 
interdependencies too (Millstein 2018a, mentioned above), are likewise present in human 
societies and likewise give rise to interdependencies; to give one example, we have an economic 
                                               
7 See the essay “Thinking Like a Mountain” in ASCA. 
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system that is based on competition, but other areas are arguably based on competition as well 
(education, government, sports).  And, like ecological interactions, our “negative” actions can 
have positive effects in some contexts or on other individuals, with interdependencies best 
thought of as a web rather than solely in terms of pair-wise interactions.  Of course, we are 
interdependent in psychological ways, too, and these may not be analogous to ecological 
interdependencies.  Like all analogies, the two things being compared are not entirely similar.  All 
Leopold needs for the argument to go through is that human interdependencies and ecological 
interdependencies are are sufficiently similar and that that interdependencies are relevant to our 
ethical rules. 
In the rest of Chapter 9, NVL question whether 1) ecosystems have evolved interests, 2) 
ecosystems are real physical entities, and 3) ecosystem health can be defined.  With respect to #1, 
it’s not clear why a characteristic needs to be evolved in order to counts as an interest; in sympathy 
with Taylor (1981), all that seems required is that the entity in question can be benefitted or 
harmed (which can be answered in the affirmative if we can respond affirmatively to question #3 
about land health).  With respect to #2 and #3, I have already sketched how land communities 
are real, physical entities (bounded by discontinuities in interactions and matter/energy flows) 
and how land health can be defined (the ability of the land to cycle nutrients efficiently and 
continuously over long periods of time).  So, none of these questions are barriers to land 
communities (“ecosystems”) having intrinsic value.  
In short, Leopold’s work offers both the argumentative tools and the conceptual tools for thinking 
that we can make sense of land communities as having intrinsic value.  Thus, the ground is 
cleared for the Leopoldian claim that preserving biodiversity is key to preserving land health for 
the sake of land communities themselves, apart from any benefit to us. 
6. Conclusion 
Although my points here are surely in need of further elaboration, I have given a sketch of the 
case for why the concerns that Newman, Varner, and Linquist raise for a Leopoldian defense of 
biodiversity do not hold – once we have in hand a more textually accurate interpretation of 
Leopold.  On this revised interpretation that I have given, Leopold’s land ethic is defended by 
the method of reflective equilibrium, showing us that the land communities that we are 
interdependent with have intrinsic value, necessitating preserving their (land) health, which in 
turn necessitates preserving biodiversity.	  
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